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The construct of the zero-sum game has several denotations in the political psychological literature on 
conflict. 
 
One common denotation is that there are a finite number of assets desired or coveted among those in 
conflict. The more one gets, the less is available for the other. Another definition is that each contestant 
has only finite resources to engage in conflict over desired and coveted assets. One loses whatever one 
uses--unless one wins the conflict and gains back what one has used and, perhaps, even more. 
 
A common response to the former denotation is that conflict is not "really" a zero-sum game wherein 
one contestant wins to another's losing. Instead, all contestants can win, and the world can concurrently 
become a more beautific place. This rarely seems to be a convincing argument--even among its 
proponents when these proponents are confronted with the loss of desired assets. 
 
A common response to the latter denotation? Again, conflict is not "really" a zero-sum game because 
resources among all contestants can actually be increased through conflict. One example of this occurs 
when more people who are represented by contestants and who are previously unengaged in the 
conflict become engaged reactive to the respective contestants losing people. In fact, the new people 
who become engaged can more than make up for those who are lost. This is what the Israelis may be 
engendering, as many people represented by the Palestinians National Authority, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, 
and other entities contesting Israel become newly activated to commit or support violence for each of 
their compatriots lost. 
 
The zero-sum game is bandied about as something that too often is correlated with conflict. 
Unfortunately, so is its converse. (See Bovasso, G. (1993). Self, group, and public interests motivating 
racial politics. Political Psychology, 14, 3-20; Brinkley, J. (April 2, 2002). In Israel, frantically figuring the 
results of military force. The New York Times, p. A8; Burns, B. D., & Vollmeyer, R. (1998). Modeling the 
adversary and success in competition. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 75, 711-718; Rapoport, 
A., & Suleiman, R. (1993). Incremental contribution in step-level public goods games with asymmetric 
players. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 55, 171-194.) (Keywords: Israel, 
Palestine, Terrorism, Zero-Sum Game.) 
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